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Abstract:   
Global labour governance has typically been approached from either industrial 
relations scholars focusing on the role of organised labour or social movement 
scholars focusing on the role of social movement organisations in mobilising 
consumption power. Yet, little work has focused on the interaction of the two. Using 
an exploratory case study of the governance response to the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, 
this article examines how complementary capacities of production and consumption-
based actors generated coalitional power, and contributed to creating the “Accord for 
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh”, making it binding and convincing more than 
180 brand-name companies to sign up. The research has implications for 
understanding how the interface between production and consumption actors may 
provide leverage to improve labour standards in global supply chains.  
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On 24th April 2013, in the Savar suburb of Dhaka, a building complex which housed 
several garment factories collapsed leaving 1129 garment workers dead and a further 
2500 injured. The building had seen four floors added without planning permission 
and was originally built as a shopping complex and office block, not a number of 
factories housing over 3000 mainly female workers and their machines. After the 
collapse, it quickly emerged that factories based in the complex produced for a 
checklist of household brands in developed countries including Primark and Walmart 
to name a few. While these multinational corporations had no legal duty of care to 
these workers, pressure grew on them to take responsibility for the incident. Within 
weeks of the disaster, a host of leading clothing brands had signed up to the “Accord 
for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh” (Hereon “The Accord”), which is 
unprecedented in its scope and legally binding nature. However the story is more 
complex than simply following a horrific human tragedy, a group of leading brands 
devised and signed up to the Accord to improve building safety in Bangladesh. This 
article uses the Accord, as an exploratory case study, to examine the emergence of 
labour governance in supply chains, particularly with respect to how production-based 
power and consumption-based power became complementary in creating coalitional 
power to establish a legally binding, collective agreement with 180 brand name 
companies. 
 
Global supply chains and the regulation of labour 
A consistent theme of the employment relations literature over the past two decades 
has been that the traditional system of national labour regulation, in which trade 
unions were the driving force of labour governance, is under strain in the globalized 
economy. An area of growing focus has been upon the shift in the regulation of labour 
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from the national level to the global level (Meardi and Marginson, 2014) where 
production is distributed across global supply chains (Gereffi, et al, 2004). Global 
supply chains pose a particular challenge to traditional forms of regulating labour in 
that they are often used explicitly to avoid regulation. Amidst growing debate on new 
forms of private, transnational governance, scholars have focused both on the shifting 
role of “traditional” actors within global labour governance, such as organized labour, 
as well as the role of “new” actors, such as consumers and collective actors who 
attempt to mobilise consumption power (Fransen and Burgoon, 2013). As a 
fragmented and polycentric patchwork of regulatory initiatives and hybrid forms of 
governance emerge, it has remained unclear what roles different actors play, how they 
can assert power in supply chain actors and how they can meaningfully cooperate.  
 
To understand how global supply chain participants can be influenced to improve 
labour conditions, it is worth examining the governance of these chains, which has 
become a major theme of debate. Gereffi’s influential framework (1994; Gereffi et al., 
2005) highlighted the role of power relations in supply chain governance. Supplier-
led supply chains are conceptualised as having concentration of power in actors closer 
to the organisation initiating production. Alternatively, buyer-led chains are 
conceptualised as having power concentrated closer to end-user organisations. They 
are thus seen as providing greater scope for consumer activism. Supply chains in the 
apparel industry are often highlighted as the archetypal buyer-led supply chains where 
large developed country brands exert significant downward pressure on their 
suppliers. While this framework focuses on the extent to which organizations may 
exert power on each other, the approach ignores whether workers or consumers have 
the capacities available to disrupt or threaten to disrupt production and consumption 
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across supply chains in response to the need to improve labour conditions. In this 
article, we explore how a coalition between those utilising consumption-based power 
and production-based power worked together to create a novel instrument of global 
labour governance. 
 
Production actors in global labour governance 
 
Unsurprisingly, the role of unions has been the main focus of industrial relations 
scholars who analyse global supply chains and focus on how unions contribute to the 
emerging global labour governance architecture (e.g. Fairbrother et al, 2013). 
National unions and global union federations have played a key role in the articulation 
of demands and the development of international regulation, such as the ILO’s 
tripartite regulatory activities, to which they are party (Jarman, 2012). As established 
actors, unions also hold access to state and intergovernmental decision-making, such 
as observer or advisory capacity, and can articulate demands and influence global 
policy making, such as social clauses in trade agreements (Cotton and Croucher, 
2009; Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2013). The power resources of unions have 
been expressed in terms of Wright’s (2000) analysis of structural and associational 
power.  
 
Structural power can be defined as “power that results simply from the location of 
workers within the economic system” (Wright, 2000: 962) and refers to the potential 
of labour to affect the production process. Within supply chains, the structural power 
of workers is high when workers are not easily substitutable; when they have effects 
on other parts of the economic system; and when knowledge of the structure of a 
supply chain enables workers to upset the flow of the chain. The associational power 
5 
 
of labour can be defined as “the various forms of power that result from the formation 
of collective organizations of workers” (Wright, 2000: 962). Within the supply chain 
context, associational power is contingent on the relationships between supplier-firm 
unions and lead firm unions, the degree of unity among unions, and the ability of 
unions to coordinate solidaristic actions across the supply chain. Wright’s framework 
has been supplemented by Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013), who have added 
institutional power, that is power enabled through participation in institutional 
arrangements like works councils and national tripartite arrangements, and 
organizational power, where the membership and democratic processes increase 
power. In addition, they highlight three “complementary” power resources- moral, 
coalitional/collaborative and strategic/logistical- which can be utilised by unions. Of 
particular relevance to this article is the idea of coalitional power resources where 
unions take resources “on loan” from groups like NGOs in advancing their agenda. 
Such coalitions may focus around member recruitment; alliances between ‘producers’ 
and ‘consumers’, particularly in relation to public services; equality and inclusion 
issues; environmental politics; and international solidarity.     
  
Despite declining aggregate representation, unions continue to retain influence in 
some sectors, individual countries and multinational corporations. In particular, 
scholars have focused on how unions have leveraged domestic industrial relations 
systems on a global level and employed methods akin to collective bargaining to 
negotiate international agreements (Anner et al, 2006; Levesque and Murray, 2010; 
Fairbrother et al, 2013). One unique example where domestic strongholds of labour 
power have been leveraged in a globalised industry is the coordinated international 
collective bargaining system for maritime shipping, a previously unregulated industry 
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(Lillie, 2005; Umney, 2013). The International Transport Workers’ Federations 
leveraged the interconnected nature of shipping to develop transnational structures for 
mobilizing industrial action. Another example where production-based power has 
played a role to establish global labour governance are International Framework 
Agreements  (Hammer, 2005; Stevis, 2010). International Framework Agreements are 
agreements between single multinational corporation and global union federations 
that set out frameworks for industrial relations throughout the corporation, and 
sometimes its supply chain.  
 
In sum, among non-state actors, unions remain the representatives of organized 
labour. One weakness of the existing frameworks (e.g. Wright, 2000; Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013) is that they have been developed in the context 
Western European, nation-state or local workplace level analysis. In addition, while 
the analysis of Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013) provides a useful overview 
to categorise alliances, this article focuses more closely on the factors which enabled 
such an alliance to operate and achieve a meaningful outcome. However, as will be 
developed later, in global supply chains with varying levels of union density and 
organization, the discussed power resources, especially structural and associational, 
are likely to be low. Thus, it is important to rethink the ways in which unions can 
utilise their role in labour governance institutions across global supply chains. 
 
Consumption actors in global labour governance 
 
Less, albeit increasing, attention in the area of industrial relations has been paid to the 
role of the consumer (Donaghey et al, 2014). The power of consumption-based actors 
in supply chains can be conceptualised using Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice and 
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loyalty framework (Donaghey et al, 2014). Consumers can exercise power through 
“exiting” (or threat thereof) the consumption relationship by boycotting goods. 
Consumers may also “buycott” through the purchase of ethically-labelled products, 
such as Fairtrade, or through “voicing” complaints and grievances to repair or 
improve the relationship. But such consumption power is not simply a spontaneous 
outcome of consumer behaviour “but the result of organised and strategic conduct by 
collective actors who are highly attuned to the potentials of consumer-activism” 
(Barnett et al., 2005: 46). As Barnett and colleagues (2005: 46) argue, “what is most 
distinctive about this new politics of choice is the nature of the agencies and 
collective organisations that serve as the mediators of engagement and participation.”  
 
We use the term of social movement organizations, which include faith groups, 
student organizations and human rights activists to describe such collective actors that 
have increasingly mobilized consumers at the end point in the global supply chain to 
put pressure on multinational corporations to behave more responsibly (O’Rourke, 
2011; Bartley, 2007). In the absence of a direct relationship between producers and 
consumers – as in global value chains – social movement organisations create “a 
chain of social connectedness” between downstream consumption acts and upstream 
production actors (Schrempf and Palazzo, 2013: 10; O’Rourke, 2011). Social 
movement organisations incite consumer activism by encouraging consumers to sign 
petitions, wear campaign badges or alert consumers by demonstrating in front of 
outlets (Barnett et al, 2005). As scholars have demonstrated (eg. Bartley, 2007), the 
mere threat of such activities may suffice to alert companies to avoid inflicting 
damage on their actual sales or reputation of their brand, which has become a 
significant intangible asset in the global economy (Lury and Moor, 2010). By 
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leveraging consumer sentiment and reputational threats, social movement 
organisations have played a critical role in pushing companies to protect labour rights 
in their global supply chains, such as through unilateral Corporate Codes of Conduct 
(Locke, 2013) or by adopting private labour standards (e.g. Bartley, 2007; Fransen 
and Burgoon, 2013).  
 
But these consumer driven governance mechanisms are far from a panacea for 
developing labour rights. Often as seen in voluntary corporate social responsibility, 
they lack meaningful enforcement, may often focus on “easy targets” rather than the 
worst offenders and lack a democratic mandate by those affected (Egels-Zanden and 
Hyllman, 2007; Locke, 2013). Nevertheless, where freedom of association is limited, 
as in many developing economies that have served as hosts for global value chain 
activities, the mobilization of consumption power is often the main vehicle for 
pressurising corporations to improve working conditions (Frenkel, 2001). It is thus 
important to understand how consumption-based actors can utilize their power over 
production processes in ways that can have a meaningful effect on labour governance. 
 
Interaction between “traditional” and “new” actors in global labour governance 
The interaction between production and consumption-based actors has been 
highlighted as an important area of investigation for global labour governance 
(Compa, 2008; Donaghey et al., 2014). This can be conceptualized as a form of 
coalitional power, which Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013) have identified as 
an important complementary power resource. Studies of union-social movement 
organisations coalitions at community level highlight that successful coalitions 
involve shared interests among parties (Frege et al, 2004; Tattersall, 2005), an 
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ideological fit between actors, and strategies for grass roots involvement (Holgate, 
2014). Union-social movement organisation coalitions in supply chains differ from 
these community based coalitions as they focus on exerting consumer based power on 
brands rather than politically based pressure on governments (O’Rourke, 2011). How 
coalitional power is built and exercised remains under-researched in global supply 
chains contexts. This is unsurprising as Compa (2004) highlights that those who 
mobilise threats of labour power have been viewed as uneasy bedfellows of those who 
mobilise consumer power (cf. Korczynski and Ott, 2004). Yet, scholars have shown 
that such coalitions can lead to improved implementation and monitoring of social 
clauses in US trade agreements (Douglas et al., 2004), increase buyer responsibility 
for labour rights (Egels-Zanden and Hyllman, 2006) and improve the governance of 
private labour standards (Fransen, 2011). Private labour standards can also play a role 
in strengthening union rights by incorporating freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining and, in some cases, have assisted the formation of local unions 
(O’Rourke, 2006). Such coalitions highlight how production and consumption-based 
power can be complementary in advancing workers’ rights (Compa, 2004; 2008).  
 
What is clear from the above is that there are weaknesses in both production- based 
and consumption-based approaches to global labour governance. As both Heery 
(1993) and Compa (2004; 2008) speculate, the interactions between consumption-
based and production-based actors can potentially be complementary in supply chain 
labour governance, yet initiatives which involve both have attracted surprisingly little 
attention. This article seeks to use an exploratory case study to investigate the 
question of how production and consumption-based capacities can interact to produce 
private labour governance in global supply chains. In particular, we examine the 
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origins of the Bangladesh Accord with a specific focus on the power resources that 
were deployed to create it, including the nature of the production-based and 
consumption-based coalition. To do this, we use the idea of complementary capacities 
to explain the nature of coalitional power in global supply chains. 
 
Research Context and Methods 
After China, Bangladesh is the second largest textile producing economy, with over 
5,000 factories employing approximately four million, mainly women, workers, 
producing primarily for the developed world. Since the textile sector evolved in 1976, 
it has dwarfed all others with $21.5bn (approximately 80% of total) in annual exports 
and 13% of GDP, according to 2012/13 figures. With the lowest minimum wage set at 
$43 per month, the Bangladeshi sector provides cheap produce from primarily 
Bangladeshi owned factories, thus removing Western brands from legal liability over 
labour abuses. From the mid-2000s onwards, and following a series of deadly factory 
fires and building collapses, including the Rana Plaza factory collapse in 2013, 
increased attention focused on labour issues within the Bangladeshi garment sector. 
Building and fire safety were often lacking, with buildings having locked exits and 
extensions upwards being built on top of existing buildings (Feldman, 2013).  
 
The Accord for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
The Accord which emerged in response to Rana Plaza is a prime example of the 
complementarity of consumption and production-based actors coming together to 
facilitate the creation of innovative governance mechanisms. The Accord reflects the 
mobilization of consumption power at the downstream end of buyer-led supply 
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chains, as brands were pressured to protect their brand image vis-à-vis the critical 
scrutiny of their consumers. For instance, the Workers’ Rights Consortium mobilized 
students as consumers of university-licenced apparel in the United States and Canada 
to include the Accord into university licence agreements. The Clean Clothes 
Campaign educated consumers about the brands sourcing from Rana Plaza and 
mobilised them to put pressure on brands to sign the Accord. But the Accord also 
reflects the mobilization of production power, as global unions pushed for going 
beyond surface-level changes towards a more substantive agreement. The result is an 
unprecedented, legally binding agreement between global union federations, 
IndustriALL and UNI Global Union, Bangladeshi trade unions, and over 190 ready-
made garment retailers and brands from 20 countries in Europe, North America, Asia 
and Australia, with four social movement organisations as “Witness Signatories” 
(Clean Clothes Campaign, Workers Rights Consortium, International Labor Rights 
Forum, Maquila Solidarity Network). Signatories agree to implement: 
 Independent safety inspections by qualified engineering experts  
 Support for factory remediation to ensure compliance with building, fire and 
electrical safety standards while maintaining employment for workers  
 Worker participation in Occupational Health & Safety Committees and 
training  
 Provision of worker complaints mechanisms & right to refuse unsafe work 
 Transparent disclosure of all ready-made garment suppliers and sub-
contractors, inspection reports and quarterly progress reports. 
 
There is a complaints procedure which has a binding arbitration system where all 
signatories agree that awards and enforcement of fees may be pursued in their 
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respective national legal systems. To ensure a solid commitment to the Accord, 
companies agree to a long-term sourcing relationship with Bangladesh, maintaining 
purchasing volumes for five years, thus providing an incentive for suppliers to invest 
in safety improvement. Brands commit to ensure that factories have the financial 
capacity to maintain safe workplaces and comply with remediation requirements 
through providing loans, accessing donor or government support or through offering 
other business incentives. Signatory firms agree to terminate contracts with factories 
that fail safety inspections. Companies assume responsibility for funding the activities 
of the Steering Committee, Safety Inspectors and Training Coordinators based on 
their annual volumes of garment purchases from Bangladesh on a sliding, pro-rata 
scale up to $500,000 per annum. The training foresees a central role for workers and 
worker representatives, including direct trade union participation in factory training 
and factory inspections. Demonstrating a commitment to transparency, all supplier 
factories and inspection reports as well as corrective action plans are made publically 
available on the Accord’s website. The Accord specializes in three types of inspection 
– fire, electrical and structural – for which specialist engineers are contracted in 





This research was based on an open-ended, inductive research design informed by a 
broad interest in understanding the complementarity of production and consumption 
mobilization in global supply chains. 29 semi-structured, open-ended interviews were 
conducted from late 2013 to early 2014 with respondents involved in the creation of 
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the Accord. Respondents included staff from trade unions (N=8), social movement 
organisations (N=8), sourcing or ethical trading managers from brands buying from 
Bangladesh (N=6), and other relevant actors, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative, 
Accord steering committee members, and Bangladeshi civil society activists (N=7). 
Snowball sampling techniques were used to identify respondents (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). After the first ten interviews, it became clear that most snowball 
recommendations tended to point to the same key actors that were involved. 
Respondents were asked to recount the events and their activities leading to the 
Accord, describe the contributions of the different parties involved to create the 
Accord, and relationships between them. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 3 
hours. All but one interview was fully recorded and transcribed verbatim. In addition, 
publicly available documents related to the Rana Plaza disaster and the Accord were 
collected. A search of the websites of brand-name apparel companies, social 
movement organisations and trade unions and their press releases in relation to Rana 
Plaza was carried out and data was collected on the Accord.  
 
Data Analysis 
Open-ended and inductive data analysis was conducted. In the first stage of analysis, 
all the data was imported into an integrated database and qualitative analysis software, 
NVivo, was used to develop, refine, and organize emerging codes. The data was 
organised by developing a chronological account, noting critical events in relation to 
the Accord. The fieldwork was ongoing throughout this stage of the analysis, and 
additional insights were used to revise the analysis. In the second step, evidence was 
gathered about the formulation of a response to the Rana Plaza disaster. Actors 
involved in negotiating the Accord – notably campaigning groups, trade unions and 
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brands, and to a certain extent the ILO and platforms such as Ethical Trading 
Initiative – were then mapped. The data was then coded according to the contributions 
made by different actors, thereby carefully comparing self-descriptions with external 
assessments. To understand better the role of the Labour Caucus (see below), the 
concrete strategies that campaign groups and trade unions used to hold brands 
responsible and get them to sign the Accord were analysed. In the third step, the 
complementarities between the strategies of social movement organisations and trade 
unions were drawn out. Evidence of concrete instances where the Labour Caucus was 
successful in making individual companies sign were analysed with a particular focus 
on how complementarities played out. In addition to positive examples, negative 
instances of companies not signing up were identified.  
 
 
Complementary capacities of production and consumption-based actors  
Central to the emergence of the Accord was the coalition between unions and social 
movement organisations forming the “Labour Caucus” which united behind a shared 
objective. The Labour Caucus consisted of two global union federations, local 
Bangladeshi unions and four social movement organisations as witness signatories, 
and was supported by online campaigning groups. Table 1 summarises the 
membership of the Labour Caucus.  
-TABLE 1  HERE- 
Our findings suggest that different actors within the Labour Caucus contributed 
complementary capacities. While the Bangladesh apparel supply chain reflects the 
low associational and structural power of workers employed in low-skilled, labour-
intensive industries of this type, Global union federations contributed critical 
representational and institutional capacities. In the context of low associational and 
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structural power of unions to disrupt production processes, the role of social 
movement organisations became important as consumption actors in shaping 
governance at the production end of the supply chain by contributing mobilisation 
capacities and expertise, which the unions lacked in the Bangladesh context.  
 
Production-based capacities: Representational  
The associational power of trade unions in Bangladesh was low in terms of 
mobilizing the traditional tools of the labour movement: collective industrial action or 
threat thereof. Union fragmentation (involving 34 union federations), low density 
(only 222 enterprise unions registered in about 4,000-5,000 factories, ILO, 2014), an 
immature system of industrial relations, and political corruption all meant that 
traditional labour resources were curtailed. Moreover, the global union federations’ 
assessment of the situation in Bangladesh was that local unions were not in a position 
to mobilise workers to take collective action. Within consumer countries, global union 
federations had relatively strong associational power through their affiliates. 
However, unions considered domestic industrial relations as the priority area for 
collective action over solidarity actions for remote workers in Bangladesh. Similarly, 
the structural power of trade unions was low in terms of the threat of withdrawing 
labour from the production process. With a large percentage of the workforce being 
young, women workers, with few alternative sources of income, workers were in a 
weak structural bargaining position to make demands. 
 
While the associational and structural power of unions was low in Bangladesh, the 
unions’ representative membership structures gave them a high capacity to make 
claims at the international level. IndustriALL had the official mandate to represent 
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factory workers in the Bangladesh ready-made garment sector. UNI Global Union had 
significant membership in some areas of retailing and could leverage industrial 
relationships with many brands. IndustriALL and UNI Global Union’s 
representational capacities were therefore complementary. This enabled the global 
union federations to mobilize bottom-up voices through their network of affiliate 
members. For companies with union recognition, the relevant unions, such as GMB, 
USDAW and UNITE in the UK or Handels in Sweden, could both negotiate with 
brand management to make internal demands or use the threat of mobilising their 
members and exert pressure. 
  
Production-based capacities: Institutional 
The global union federations contributed institutional access within the global 
governance arena - an access which social movement organisations mostly lacked. 
The unions leveraged their formal role in the institutionalized governance landscape, 
particularly as constituents of the tripartite structure of the International Labour 
Organisation. This institutional embeddedness helped gain the official endorsement of 
the International Labour Organisation for the Accord through its agreement to Chair 
the Accord steering committee. In addition, it also enabled the unions to link to a 
broad network of global level institutions as well as local level agencies.  
 
The other institutional dimension was that unions were viewed by many of the brands 
as being legitimate “insiders” to the employment relationship and regarded as more 
appropriate negotiation partners because they shared a mutual interest in the well-
being of the company and responsibility for the success of collective agreements. In 
contrast to social movement organisations, the unions were insiders and viewed as 
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having “as much skin in the game on this as the companies have. So they’re not 
sitting on the outside and watching: they’re in the centre!”, as a respondent from the 
UK’s Ethical Trading Initiative observed. Being embedded in the well-established 
structure of collective bargaining with companies on a local, national, and 
international level also gave unions direct access to and influence at company 
headquarters where unions were recognized. Having such ongoing relationships 
enabled more cooperative bargaining and a willingness on both sides to compromise 
to retain existing relations. This enabled global and national union federations to 
leverage existing national collective bargaining institutions at the global level, for 
instance, by contacting staff at corporate headquarters.  
 
Consumption-based capacities: Mobilising  
 
Placed at the end point of the global supply chain and within a highly competitive 
consumer market, consumers had considerable voice and exit power. Consumer voice 
was seen to be expressed “via agencies that speak on their behalf,” as a brand 
respondent stated. These agencies, including the Clean Clothes Campaign and 
Workers Rights Consortium, were powerful in their ability to mobilise consumers to 
threaten to withdraw their purchasing power. This played a critical role in lifting 
labour rights violations from mere ethical to strategic concerns for companies. The 
key leverage point of campaign groups was creating a reputational risk to companies 
by damaging, or threatening to damage, their brand image through repeated negative 
press or as one trade union interviewee stated “their main purpose as a campaign 
organisation is to campaign which means pointing the finger where things are wrong 
and then creating public pressure to change the situation.” Social movement 
organisations stood outside the tripartite system of industrial relations. Yet, this 
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political non-accountability meant, in theory, greater freedom to agitate and engage in 
contentious politics to raise awareness and pressurise companies. The social 
movement organisations were thus regarded as “vital in creating the energy and the 
noise and the push” for companies to sign the Accord. The mere threat of exit also 
posed a particular threat to specific brands in specific markets, which were at risk of a 
“short term strategic kind of boycotting” (social movement organisation interviewee).  
 
While the witness signatories straddled the thin line between engaging and attacking 
corporations, online campaigns, including Avaaz, SumOfUs and change.org, occupied 
a role at the margin of the Labour Caucus. This role was effective in generating what 
respondents called “surge capacity”. Online campaigners would send email petitions 
to their large mailing lists asking members support particular causes (2.8 million 
members globally in the case of SumOfUs). In a successful campaign, this could 
confront “offending” companies with a large number of people who declared 
themselves as consumers and/or users calling on them to take remediating action, 
such as signing the Accord.  
 
 
Consumption-based capacities: Expertise  
In terms of making credible claims and rendering labour rights violations visible to 
consumers, social movement organisations were crucial in contributing expertise and 
in-depth knowledge of the industry. Social movement organisations research on the 
Bangladesh ready-made garment sector was critical in bringing to light the plight of 
textile workers, and thereby making visible the connection between consumers in 
developed countries and the workers who make their brand-name clothes. Their role 
as “international watchdogs” was particularly important in the context of the 
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Bangladeshi textile sector. Workers Rights Consortium staff on the ground worked 
closely with a number of labour rights organisations and unions. In addition, actors 
who may otherwise have questioned the representational legitimacy of the social 
movement organisations rationalised their participation in terms of their knowledge 
and commitment of work in the Bangladesh garment sector.  
 
Both global union federations recognized that they lacked expertise in the Bangladesh 
garment sector due to low union membership. In addition, UNI Global Union, coming 
from the service sector in developed economies had few dealings with the types of 
issues at hand. The Clean Clothes Campaign, with their knowledge of the garment 
sector, and the Workers’ Rights Consortium, with their Bangladesh specific 
knowledge, brought the sort of expertise that unions would normally bring to the 
table. This was important in formulating realistic and credible demands that both 
fulfilled the needs of people on the ground as well as recognising limited capabilities. 
Yet, a majority of workers in the garment industry had little knowledge about their 
rights and lacked skills to exercise them. This required a very different approach to 
engaging workers in monitoring activities compared to the approach used with 
relatively empowered and more knowledgeable retail workers in Western companies.  
 
 
How were complementary capacities utilised in creating the Accord? 
 
The coalition and associated division of labour between unions and social movement 
organisations was perceived as crucial in leveraging relationships to establish the 
Accord. Relationships between the parties within the Labour Caucus had built up over 
time since the Spectrum factory collapse in 2005 and intensified following the 
Tazreen factory fire in 2012, which killed 112. Frustrated with existing Corporate 
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Social Responsibility activities by brands that had mainly focused on social auditing 
of suppliers, the Workers Rights Consortium and the Clean Clothes Campaign 
attempted to establish a “Memorandum of Understanding” for brands to invest in 
building safety in Bangladesh, yet it failed to gather the necessary support of at least 
four companies to sign the commitment. When Rana Plaza occurred, the Labour 
Caucus regarded the disaster as confirmation that the prevailing social auditing 
paradigm was “a model that has failed” (IndustriALL interviewee) to address the 
entrenched structural problems.i The emphasis became creating a proper, legally 
binding collective agreement with IndustriALL and UNI Global Union being the 
global union federations involvedii. 
 
In negotiating the Accord, the representational legitimacy and institutional weight of 
IndustriALL and UNI Global Union enabled the development of a collective 
agreement, while consumer pressure mobilized by social movement organisations 
strengthened the unions’ bargaining position. Importantly, the power of the Labour 
Caucus was illustrated by its ability to trump an industry-driven solution in favour of 
a legally binding, collective agreement. By April 2013 when Rana Plaza collapsed, 
only two companies, Tschibo (Germany) and PVH (USA), had signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding. The German Development Agency was 
simultaneously attempting to develop an alternative initiative with the Global Social 
Compliance Program that was in line with the industry-driven social auditing regime.  
 
Shortly after Rana Plaza occurred, both approaches were being discussed at a meeting 
of unions, social movement organisations and brands in Eschborn, Germany. The 
united Labour Caucus aligned its position to insist on a broad line: a binding 
agreement, financial responsibility of brands, the role of unions and independent and 
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transparent inspections. Using the momentum created by the disaster, this created a 
“pressure cooker” effect on companies. Companies in contrast lacked a unified 
position. The meeting ended without a clear outcome but with the Labour Caucus 
demanding companies sign the Memorandum of Understanding by a deadline of 15th 
May 2013.  
 
Both the unions and social movement organisations went beyond their normal ‘roles’ 
which had previously divided them. Prior to this, IndustriALL had invited brands and 
NGOs to a meeting in Geneva to negotiate a compromise. But following Rana Plaza, 
widely described as a “game changer” and frustration with brands’ response, 
IndustriALL was now ready to insist on a binding agreement. In turn, the Clean 
Clothes Campaign and Workers Rights Consortium were ready to leave the 
negotiations to IndustriALL rather than campaign against companies. The Accord 
became “a very high priority” for the unions to the extent that the General Secretaries 
of IndustriALL and UNI Global Union became involved and negotiated directly with 
the brands over the Accord. Between 29th April and 15th May 2013 numerous 
bilateral and multi-lateral conversations were led by IndustriALL to negotiate the 
content of what became the “Accord.”  
 
While some corporate actors were pushing to water down the Memorandum of 
Understanding to a more principle-based agreement, IndustriALL insisted on a 
substantive agreement instead of negotiating a weaker compromise. The Labour 
Caucus recognised the unique opportunity that they had to reach an unprecedented 
binding agreement. If such a demand could not be formulated in a situation in which 
the bargaining power of the Labour Caucus was backed by the enormous consumer 
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pressure that Western companies faced, then they would never be able to do it. “I 
think that’s why, that’s what made us so determined to stand by it, to fight it out with 
the companies,” as a respondent from UNI Global Union explained.  
 
Social movement organisations contributed vital expertise to the negotiations while 
refraining from immediate campaigning. Crucially, the Workers’ Rights Consortium’s 
“fact finding” directly after Rana Plaza provided key evidence about the buyers 
present at the factory. This prevented brands denying that they were sourcing from 
Rana Plaza – a practice that some brands had attempted. Those brands who were 
shown to source from the factory complex, such as Primark, were among the most 
responsive and early signatories to the Accord.iii In terms of crafting the text of the 
Accord, the unions relied on the social movement organisations for expertise and 
input that provided “a reality check” which was crucial in making the Accord work. 
Through this coordinated approach to negotiating on multiple levels, the Accord 
evolved “behind the scenes”, and retained the key feature of being binding while 
integrating two key changes: linking to the Bangladeshi National Action Plan and 
bringing in the ILO as the chair of the Accord steering committee. 
 
 
Getting companies to sign the agreement 
The Labour Caucus took a collective approach and united behind a single demand of 
Western retail companies – sign the Accord. Compressing the complexity of factory 
safety in Bangladesh into one single demand helped focus attention and coordination 
of actions. Pressure was created by the combination of “insider” unions leveraging 
institutional relationships and using threats of collective action and “outsider” social 




Leveraging institutional position and threat of collective action  
In getting companies to sign the Accord, unions took on the primary role of 
negotiating directly with companies by leveraging their institutional “insider” 
position. The campaign to get H&M, the largest buyer from Bangladesh, to become 
the first signatory to the Accord illustrates the unions’ ability to leverage pre-existing 
relationships. Due to the existence of International Framework Agreements, 
respondents emphasized that IndustriALL and UNI Global Union had very 
constructive relationships with Inditex and H&M respectively, both on the 
manufacturing side as well as on the retail side. Yet, negotiation on a global supply 
chain level was fundamentally different to more traditional unionism where one union 
was negotiating with one employer, a model which was seen as ineffective to address 
the deep-seated, structural safety issues in a global supply chain that was as mobile 
and fragmented as the Bangladeshi garment industry. To tackle multiple companies, 
there was close co-operation between the global union federations to play off lead 
brands against each other to sign the Accord with UNI Global Union targeting H&M 
and IndustriALL targeting Inditex. Union representatives reported that they “used a 
lot of credit that we had from developing those relationships to exert pressure on 
them. It was not always pleasant but I think it paid off to have an Accord.” 
 
To exert pressure on the Swedish fashion retailer, UNI Global Union leveraged both 
its existing International Framework Agreement with the company as well as its 
national affiliate’s high level of density in union membership. H&M (2014) reports 
that 63% of its employees worldwide are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. Invited by UNI Global Union, the Swedish union organising retail 
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workers, Handels, used its relationship with H&M to have a dialogue at the 
company’s Swedish headquarters. In addition, unions published an advertisement in 
one of Sweden’s biggest newspapers to urge garment retailers to sign the Accord. 
While they did not have to resort to worker mobilisation, the potential and threat of 
doing so was perceived as a powerful lever in motivating companies to sign the 
Accord. Their own employees putting demands on their employers in petitions was 
seen to “resonate very, very strongly within those companies.” On 15th May 2013, 
H&M became the first signatory to the Accord, followed by Inditex. 
 
Mobilizing consumer pressure 
In addition to demonstrating the role of production-based power, the case of H&M 
also illustrates the complementarity of social movement organisations and unions. 
Union negotiation was strengthened by the threat of renewed negative publicity. After 
having been previously exposed over living wages in Cambodia and pulled out “of its 
Swedish comfort zone” as a Clean Clothes Campaign interviewee described it, H&M 
was vulnerable to consumer activism and the retailer was aware that the Clean 
Clothes Campaign had been preparing a large-scale campaign against it.  
 
The close link between the Workers’ Rights Consortium and university students – an 
important consumer group for many collegiate supplier brands such as Adidas – 
created consumer pressure in key markets. In particular, the Workers’ Rights 
Consortium, founded by the US-student activist group United Students Against 
Sweatshops, engaged students in its over 180 affiliate colleges and universities in the 
US and Canada to advocate for university administrators to add the Accord to 
licensing requirements. For instance, student-led campaigns at over five prestigious 
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US campuses led Fruit of the Loom in November 2013 to sign the Accord despite 
already having been a member of the industry-led Alliance, as the company could not 
afford to lose consumers in its important collegiate market. 
 
Social movement organisations benefitted from the freedom as “outsiders” to agitate 
and “name and shame” individual companies who refused to sign the Accord. A 
Clean Clothes Campaign interviewee argued that “it’s not their [the unions’] role to 
do campaigning”. Similarly, this quote from a UNI Global Union representative 
captures the complementarity of unions and social movement organizations in 
fulfilling negotiation and mobilization roles: 
“Once you have exhausted your area of negotiation, once you’ve got your 
point where it’s just, you have to recognise as a union that you know, you just 
cannot get any further, the company is refusing to negotiate, that’s when we 
very much need the campaign organisations because they are simply better 
than us in public campaigning.” 
However, there was a fine line to decide when the possibility of negotiation was 
exhausted and when a public campaign, with the potential to create a more conflictual 
relationship with a company, should start. Social movement organisations agreed that 
this line “where we’d have to break ranks and do a campaign” (Clean Clothes 
Campaign interviewee) would have to be negotiated with the unions. While social 
movement organisations were credited with mobilising consumer pressure, “the 
maturity of IndustriALL and unions knowing about negotiation, not just campaigning, 
was the important counter point” (Ethical Trading Initiative interviewee). Unions thus 
stressed that they worked “very, very closely with those groups” (IndustriALL 
interviewee) and were in direct contact with them on an almost daily basis. In some 
cases, trade union organizations led campaigns and thereby shaped the emerging 
storyline in the media. In the UK, the Trades Union Congress identified eight critical 
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brands that had not signed the Accord by September 2013. The union collaborated 
with the Clean Clothes Campaign and SumofUs to create a coordinated consumer-
oriented campaign involving leafleting in front of brand-name apparel stores.  
 
Online campaign groups such as SumOfUs helped raise consumer awareness and 
exert consumer pressure through online petitions against companies to sign the 
Accord, such as Gap and Walmart in the US, Coles and Rivers in Australia, Loblaw 
in Canada or River Island and Edinburgh Woollen Mill in the UK. While not directly 
part of the Labour Caucus, these online campaign groups did coordinate some of their 
actions with organised labour. For instance, in the UK, the Trades Union Congress 
and SumOfUs coordinated a successful campaign against River Island with about 
17,000 signatures from UK consumers, which played an important part in persuading 
the UK-based fashion retailer to sign the Accord.  
 
However, online campaigning groups were also seen as “uncontrollable” and their 
interventions could sometimes be non-constructive. Surge capacity was a short-term 
campaigning strategy that attempted to build on outrage about news in the media 
rather than longer-term coordinated action with other parties. The delicate 
complementarity between union-led negotiations and activist agitation is illustrated by 
online campaigning against Topshop. Online campaigners, who neither had direct 
relationships with the company nor pursued negotiations, were building a public 
petition against Topshop, a UK high-street fashion retailer, to pressurize them into 
signing the Accord. Yet, the brand was simultaneously in negotiations with unions 
and threatened to walk away from the Accord if they were publicly campaigned 
against. The petition was withdrawn after the negative reaction in the test phase, and 
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shortly after, Topshop signed the Accord. While this success was attributed to the 
skills of union negotiators, respondents acknowledged an additional contribution: 
“having that implicit threat helped focus minds”, stated a respondent from SumOfUs. 
But the unions found it difficult to work with online groups strategically due to their 
unwillingness to cooperate. 
 
Reconciling negotiation and mobilisation: Role division and conflict 
Respondents stressed the importance of maintaining a clear division of roles, 
particularly with regards to the different mandates of unions and social movement 
organisations. Unions were especially careful to uphold the distinction between the 
representative role of unions and the advocacy role of social movement organisations. 
The establishment of role division is manifested in the governance structure of the 
Accord. While unions were represented on the steering committee, social movement 
organisations accepted, albeit reluctantly, being “witness” signatories to the Accord in 
recognition of the representational capacities of unions. Being granted the role of 
observers was seen as an important acknowledgement of what the role of a social 
movement organisations was vis-à-vis the role of a trade union, even though the 
observer role gave no voting power. “It’s just making sure that those lines are clearly 
held at the interface bit base. But that is always a challenge,” a Clean Clothes 
Campaign respondent admitted. 
 
As with any labour movement, a tension exists between when to negotiate and settle, 
on the one hand, and when to mobilise and campaign, on the other. While trade union 
negotiations and campaigning were both seen as valid approaches that could both 
achieve progress, this led to some tensions and divergence on tactical issues. 
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Campaigners were both useful and distracting in the process of negotiating the 
Accord: 
“The campaigning NGOs were a double-edged sword in the sense that yes, the 
campaigning got the media involved and yes, the campaigning helped create the 
noise, but in my opinion they didn’t know when to switch off and move into 
negotiation. So there is a time when you’ve got them [brands] round the table, 
so stop shouting at them and listen and engage.” (Anonymized respondent) 
This clash of perspectives is illustrated by the joint consumer campaign between the 
Trades Union Congress in the UK and the Clean Clothes Campaign against 
Edinburgh Woollen Mills. The UK high street retailer was targeted for its refusal to 
sign the Accord, its failure to pay into the victims’ compensation fund for Rana Plaza 
and other disasters like Tazreen, and its failure to even negotiate with the unions. The 
national union federation and the social movement organisation planned joint action 
to create awareness among consumers outside a number of Edinburgh Woollen Mills 
stores across the UK on 24th November 2013, to mark the first anniversary of the 
Tazreen factory fire. However, just a few days before the action, Edinburgh Woollen 
Mills, afraid of alienating its consumers and risking reputational damage, signed the 
Accord. Not all demands had been met, such as compensation payments for Rana 
Plaza victims. But for the Trades Union Congress, the company’s decision was seen 
as a victory. It called off the day of action. Keen to continue the campaign for victim 
compensation, the social movement organisation was frustrated that the Trades Union 
Congress had called off the campaign and, instead, had commended Edinburgh 
Woollen Mill for signing the Accord.  
 
The challenge for social movement organisations was seen as making the step from 
being a campaigning organisation which had no formal members to represent and thus 
no formal responsibility to being a responsible negotiator. Trade unionists were 
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frustrated that campaigners were up to the last minute making “unreasonable” 
demands, thereby jeopardising the progress made and the “success in their hands.” 
Social movement organisations interviewees, in contrast, demonstrated a frustration 
with the lengthy practices of working through formal institutions. With the main 
approach of campaign organisations being to attract publicity through campaigns, it 
was harder for them to try to negotiate privately before going after companies 
publicly. “They are in this campaign mentality and immediately switch into public 
action while we from our background are more used to negotiating things,” a 
respondent from UNI Global Union said. 
 
The global union federations’ representative and institutional capacities were also a 
constraint to their ability to put pressure on companies. Global union federations had 
often long-term relationships with companies through their affiliated unions. Unions 
had to make a judgement call as to how far they could go when exerting pressure so 
that they would not do lasting damage to national labour relations, such as pay 
bargaining, when pursuing issues for workers beyond their direct membership. Union 
negotiators were seen to make “the more mature reflection” to leverage the energy of 
social movement organisations but be prepared to negotiate with industry as partners. 
For unions, companies were ultimately going to be the partner that delivered on the 
Accord. “Beating people around the head and saying you’re evil and you must sign 
this or else you’ll burn in hell is never a great negotiating stance for a partnership,” a 
respondent from the Ethical Trading Initiative explained, and added that unions 
therefore regarded the Accord “not as a chance to bash companies but as a chance to 
engage them”. Collective action was seen as the last resort rather than the starting 




Discussion: The role of consumption relations in governing production relations  
Comparing the Accord to alternative consumption and production-based 
governance 
Despite years of experimentation, new governance approaches such as social auditing 
have not delivered on their promises. Both production and consumption-based 
approaches have revealed serious limitations with regards to their ability to improve 
workers’ rights in global supply chains. Scholars have lamented the failure of the 
voluntary, private regime of social auditing (Locke, 2013), as also demonstrated by 
the series of collapses and fires in factories despite social auditing. Without doubt, the 
jury on the efficacy of the Accord is out: the mechanism is new and the arrangement 
is complex. Ultimately, the Accord will have to be judged in terms of what it delivers 
for garment workers in Bangladesh as it progresses over its initial five-year life span. 
However, the Accord stands out as a unique and novel governance mechanism 
compared to existing mechanisms on a number of dimensions. Table 2 compares the 
Accord with existing types of supply chain labour governance: International 
Framework Agreements, Multi-stakeholder standards and Corporate Codes of 
Conduct. In rows 3-4 it describes, from low to high, the role of consumption-based 
power, and production-based power, in formulating and implementing global labour 
governance. What is important to note here is that in the Accord, the effect of the 
power resources is manifest in the creation of a coalition, rather than operating 
independently, as in other governance mechanisms outlined in Table 2.  
----- Insert Table 2 ---- 
First, in terms of governance actors involved outlined in row 2 of Table 2, the Accord 
allows brands to take a collective approach to the problem of worker safety. Unlike 
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International Framework Agreements, which are generally agreed between one 
multinational corporation and a global union federation, the Accord covers multiple 
brands (in excess of 180) and brings brands together to share costs, information, 
responsibility and risk, providing a cost-effective way for smaller brands to ensure 
safety standards. The Accord also stands out for being able to reach a large number of 
suppliers (in excess of 1500 factories employing more than two million workers) 
within a sector, backed by legal enforceability, thus avoiding the problem associated 
with International Framework Agreements which often work best where they are 
needed least, i.e. in those sites where workers are organised and/or have strong legal 
support (Niforou, 2014). While not all factories are covered by the Accord, 
approximately half of all workers in the sector and most of those in directly exporting 
firms are covered by the Accord. Also, private labour standards have proliferated in 
the textile sectors, but they lack the Accord’s ability to coordinate multiple 
approaches, leading to competition and lack of coordination (Fransen, 2011). The 
collective brand approach of the Accord thus also brings benefits to supplier firms in 
Bangladesh by having a unified set of standards, rather than suppliers attempting to 
satisfy a multiplicity of codes of conduct for different buyers.  
 
Secondly, in terms of modes of implementation and enforcement (row 5-6 of Table 2), 
the Accord has created an enforceable contractual relationship in the home country of 
the buyer brands. International Framework Agreements depend on using the structural 
and associational power of labour, which thus depends on high levels of collective 
worker organisation. For multi-stakeholder standards and codes of conduct, the only 
sanction available is the threat to brands depending on consumption power. The 
legally binding nature of the Accord also stands in stark contrast to the “Alliance” – 
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an alternative corporate social responsibility and safety inspection programme with 26 
members created by mainly US-based brands unwilling to sign the Accord. The point 
about the establishment of a legally enforceable contract is a very significant new 
departure in global supply chain labour governance. Through the Accord, brands have 
transferred oversight of their supply chain to a body which has a right to initiate legal 
action against the brands where they do not meet their commitments. It remains to be 
seen how the Accord will enforce sanctions. This sort of initiative has been mooted 
unsuccessfully in the past (Bronfenbrenner, 2007) but was achieved in this instance 
due to the pressure placed on brands by the harnessing of the complementary 
capacities of labour and consumption actors.  
 
Thirdly, in terms of content and limitations (row 7-8 of Table 2), while the Accord is 
focused on three highly specific and highly defined issues – electrical, fire and 
building safety – International Framework Agreements and private labour standards 
often cover a wider variety of industrial relations issues, but may be less able to 
deliver in terms of expertise required and monitoring involved. The Accord also 
focuses on an area of the employment relationship which has traditionally lent itself to 
regulation, that of worker safety. Nevertheless, legal regulation of safety has led in 
other contexts to employment improvement in other areas (Anner et al, 2013) and 
could have meaningful effect in terms of spillover to other areas of employment 
relations in the Bangladesh sector. Moreover, what the Accord demonstrates is that 
companies can be persuaded through private tactics to develop credible commitments 
around worker rights. For future research, it would be thus worth examining how the 





Insights from negotiating the Accord: Building coalitional power through 
complementary capacities 
The Accord is a unique governance mechanism. Understanding the conditions that 
enabled it to emerge offers potentially important lessons for the development of 
meaningful global governance institutions in other contexts. First, we highlighted the 
role of “complementary capacities” in developing private governance frameworks. 
This concept of “complementary capacities” has helped to explain how and why the 
coming together of multiple actors may generate governance solutions which might 
not have been available with contributions from single-actor groups. While scholars 
have emphasized the multiplicity of actors involved in global governance arenas, it 
has not been quite clear how different types of actors contribute and create new 
opportunities for “collaborative governance” (Rasche, 2010). In our case, both the 
tactics – the combination of contentious politics of social movement organisations 
mobilization and the negotiation route of unions enabled by representative structures 
– and the sources of legitimacy – expertise and institutional embeddedness – were 
complementary. Complementary capacities which generate coalitional power may be 
developed in other areas including environmental and financial governance where 
coalitions of interests combine to develop governance initiatives. However, our case 
also suggests that the creation of coalitional power was not unproblematic as issues 
around democratic mandate, speed of response and related issues created tensions, 
which may, under different circumstances, hinder the forming of effective coalitions. 
Future studies thus need to investigate under what conditions capacities developed 
between actors may become complementary and under what conditions they may 
become conflictual. In this case, one of the key factors was that long-lasting 
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relationships between actors had led to a mutual recognition among the actors of their 
complementary capacities and division of roles. This may not be replicable in other 
contexts. Similarly, parties were ideologically committed to complementing each 
other rather than competing with or substituting each other which also may not be the 
case in other circumstances. 
 
Second, in analysing the inter-organizational governance of supply chain actors 
(Gereffi et al., 2005), this article highlights that scholars need to extend their analysis 
of power to the actors at the very beginning and at the very end of supply chains – and 
the collective agencies able to mobilise their power: organized labour and social 
movement organisations. The governance of labour relations within supply chains 
must be viewed through the prism of both production and consumption relations. 
Production which has moved to the developing world has often done so to avoid 
higher regulatory standards, as in the Bangladeshi case where a weak state and low 
worker organisation led to a downward spiral in safety terms. Thus, the capacity in 
the short term to develop meaningful collective bargaining is highly limited. But 
consumer based activity alone can often be short term and, lacking a meaningful 
enforcement mechanism other than brand damage, lead to symbolic commitments 
often associated with voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility. Future work can thus 
examine how the role of organized labour may impact the design and implementation 
of Corporate Social Responsibility policies. Conversely, narrowly focusing on unions 
and member based organisations is likely to limit the scope of industrial relations 
scholars to conceptualise the nature of global supply chains. The geographic and 
economic differences within global supply chains may mean that actors need to move 
towards working together around complementary capacities and to move away from 
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taking unilateral approaches. The formation of coalitional power through the 
utilization of complementary capacities could prove an important part of extending 
regulation of employment into other less regulated supply chain contexts. 
 
Conclusion  
The Accord and in particular the complementary capacities developed in its Labour 
Caucus does carry important lessons for future research. Based on our analysis of how 
campaign groups and trade unions coordinated a unified response to the 2013 Rana 
Plaza disaster, we argue that the intersection of production and consumption power, 
which has received little attention to date, is a potent mechanism that can foster labour 
rights in global supply chains. This research complements that of industrial relations 
scholars and social movement scholars by offering understanding of how distinctive 
leverage points of different governance actors can interact in complementary ways to 
create coalitional power. The consumer-driven and market-based logic of corporate 
social responsibility and the collective bargaining-based logic of industrial relations 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The interface of these logics may provide a 
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Table 1: The Accord Labour Caucus 
Union Signatories 
Name Founded Constituency Mandate 
IndustriALL Global 
Union 
2012  Affiliate unions in over 100 
countries with about 50 
million members 
Global level representation of workers across supply chains in mining, energy 
and manufacturing sectors.  
Accord: Textile workers in Bangladesh 
UNI Global Union 2000  900 affiliate unions with 
about 20 million members 
Global level representation of skills and service sectors. 
Accord: Retail and distribution workers in developed countries 
Bangladeshi unions (6 
garment workers unions 
incl. IndustriALL 
Bangladesh Council) 
Various About 6% of Bangladeshi 
garment workers covered by 
unions 
Bangladesh Textile and Garments Workers League, Bangladesh Independent 
Garments Workers Union Federation, Bangladesh Garments, Textile & Leather 
Workers Federation, Bangladesh Garment & Industrial Workers Federation, 
IndustriALL Bangladesh Council, Bangladesh Revolutionary Garments 
Workers Federation, National Garments Workers Federation, United 
Federation of Garments Workers 
Witness Signatories 
Name Founded Constituency Mandate 
Worker Rights 
Consortium  
2001 175 college and university 
affiliates in USA 
Labor rights monitoring organization, conducting investigations of working 
conditions in factories around the globe with focus is the labor practices of 
factories that manufacture university-licenced apparel. 
Clean Clothes Campaign  1989 Alliance of 16 campaign 
organizations in Europe and 
partner network of 200 
organizations & unions 
Educate and mobilise consumers, lobby companies and governments, and offer 
direct solidarity support to workers as they fight for their rights and demand 
better working conditions. 
International Labor 
Rights Forum  
1986  Nonprofit advocacy organization dedicated to achieving just and humane 





1994   Based in Canada and works in solidarity with grassroots women's and labour 
rights organizations in Mexico and Central America, to strengthen their 
capacity of to challenge the negative impacts of globalization on workers in the 





Table 2: Comparison of global labour governance instruments 





Corporate Codes of Conduct 
Governance actors Global union federations, 
local unions, 180 brands, 
ILO, social movement 
organisation signatories 









Low associational and 
structural but provides 
institutional and 
representational capacity 
to create coalitional power  





High voice power through 
mobilisation and provides 
expertise to create 
coalitional power 
Low High voice power High voice power 
Modes of 
implementation 
Sectorial, 3rd party auditing  
Collective remediation 





Typically 3rd party 
certification of specific 
production facilities; Some 
communicated through a 
recognizable consumer 
label 
1st or 2nd party self-monitoring of firms and 
suppliers 
Enforcement Legally binding arbitration Political negotiation Loss of certificate/ 
potential loss of business 
contract 
Loss of business contract 
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Content Procedural: Building and 
fire safety standards 
Substantive: Sourcing 
commitment 
Remediation activities and 
financing 
Extensive worker training 




corporation and suppliers 
May include substantive 
agreements 
Procedural: Set of broad 
labour standards to be 
applicable to corporate 
suppliers 
Some worker training 
Procedural: Set of broad labour standards to be 
applicable to suppliers 
Limited worker training 
Limitations Limited to fire and 
building safety standards 
only, limited to 5 year 
period, Sustainability and 
replicability in question 
Limited diffusion to few 
firms, lack of 
enforcement by 
independent suppliers  
Lack of enforcement, 
multiple audits without 
substantive improvements, 
compliance-focused with 
lack of labour voice 
Lack of enforcement, multiple audits without 
substantive improvements, compliance-focused 
with lack of labour voice 
Examples Bangladesh Accord on 
Building and Fire Safety 
Danone; Accor Hotels; 
Telefonica; Volkswagen 
Social Accountability 
International, Fair Wear 













                                                 
i Both unions and social movement organisations had been involved with these social auditing 
programmes, but were increasingly distancing themselves from initiatives which were seen to have lost 
the counterbalance to industry and which were not seen to have demonstrated progress. For instance, 
UNI Global Union left the Social Compliance Initiative after they were frustrated that the initiatives 
had failed to respond to the Ali Entreprises factory fire in Pakistan, and also left the Building 
Compliance Initiative after the Rana Plaza factory collapse. 
ii The Accord was not the only response by Western corporation to the Rana Plaza disaster. 26 mainly 
US-based brands joined the “Alliance” – an alternative corporate social responsibility-led inspection 
programme that lacked the substantive features of the Accord. 
iii H&M and Inditex, the first and second signatory after PVH and Tschibo on the earlier Memorandum 
of Understanding, were not found to have sourced from Rana Plaza. 
